Annex 5 Case Studies and Lessons

BRT – CASE STUDY 5
Transjakarta, Jakarta (Indonesia): The First BRT system in South Asia (opened in 2004)

Source: ITDP

Closed Trunk System without a Feeder System

Elevated Platform for Rapid Boarding and Alighting

Public Sector Bus Procurement and Private Sector Bus Operation

Operating at 65,000 passengers/day (higher than projected)

Summary of the System
Capacity 2,700 persons/hour/ direction
Users (whole system) 65,000 passengers per day (no feeder system)
Segregated busways on trunk roads 12.9km (2004)
Headway 2–3 minutes (peak period)
Number of Buses 56 (no feeder system)
Bus vehicle capacity per unit 83 passengers
Infrastructure cost US$1.0 million/km
Ticket price US$ 0.30

City Characteristics


Source: Wikipedia

  • Jakarta is the capital and largest city of Indonesia with the ninth largest urban population density in the world.
  • Jakarta has an area of 661.52km2, an urban population of 8,792,000, and a population density of 13,300/km2.
  • Road traffic is very congested, especially during peak hours because of the city’s high population density.
  • Indonesia’s GDP per capita (2006) is US$3,900.

The ‘Before’ Situation

  • Between 1985 and 1993, the number of daily commuters from the suburbs to Jakarta increased fourfold.
  • In 1998, 24.5% of total trips were made by car, 26.2% by motorcycle, and 49.3% by public transport (which mostly were by bus).
  • In the late 1990s, the average annual growth rate in vehicles was more than 9%.
  • Highways were heavily congested.
  • The bus system in Jakarta used route licenses granted by the government to different operators without coordinating service on the route or regulating service quality, frequency, reliability, or safety.

BRT Scheme Characteristics:

The projected trunk busway network consists of seven corridors. The first corridor opened in 2004 with a 12.9km fully segregated median busway. The system is a closed trunk system without a functioning feeder system.

Scheme Cost: Corridor 1: US$1 million/km


Source: Transjakarta homepage


Source: ITDP

Segregated Central Busways:The busway is located in the center of the roadway and segregated from other traffic. The busway occupies only one lane on each side. The average distance between stations is 700m.

High Frequency and Long Hours of Operation: Buses are operated at intervals of 2–3 minutes during rush hours and 3–4 minutes during the off peak period. The service starts at 5:00 AM and ends at 10:00 PM.

Elevated Stations Connected to Sidewalk: Stations provide an elevated platform for rapid boarding and alighting. In most cases the stations are connected to the sidewalk by a pedestrian bridge and ramps.

Newly Acquired Buses with a Capacity of 83: For the first busway operation, 56 new buses were acquired. They are all air conditioned units with 31 seats and a standing capacity of 52. The total capacity of each bus (83) is much less than that of most other BRT systems in the world.

Increase in Traffic Congestion in Mixed Traffic Lanes: The closed bus lane was converted from an existing mixed traffic lane without regulatory controls. As a result, even after new buses were put into service on the new bus lane, almost all the buses originally running along the corridor continued to operate in the mixed traffic lanes parallel to the bus lane. This removal of existing buses significantly increased congestion in mixed traffic lanes.

Higher Demand than Projected: As of 2005, the busway corridor had a demand of 60,000–65,000 passengers per day and around 2,300–2,500 passengers per direction in the peak hour. The demand is higher than projected because of significantly increased congestion on the mixed traffic lane. The service is attracting 14% of passengers from private cars, 6% from motorcycles, and 5% from taxies and competing bus routes.

Cheap but Limited Distance of Service: The fare negotiated was reasonable at only about US$0.30, slightly lower than that for air-conditioned buses in the corridor. However, normal air-conditioned buses travel much farther. In addition, because of the lack of a feeder bus system, it is difficult for TransJakarta to capture passengers traveling long distances.

Demand and Revenue Limitation: Although demand along TransJakarta Corridor 1 is higher than projected, it is still less than a half of the total public transport passengers in the corridor due to a lack of a feeder system. As a result, revenue is just able to cover operating costs but is insufficient to cover bus procurement costs.

Capacity Limitations: The capacity of TransJakarta corridor 1 is only 2,700 persons/hour/ direction, which compares unfavorably with other BRT systems in the world, such as those of Curitiba and Quito, which have capacities of 12,000 persons/hour/direction, and Bogota with a capacity of 35,000 persons/hour/direction on two lanes. One of the main reasons for Transjakarta’s low capacity is the relatively small size of its buses. Another reason is that both its buses and bus stations have only one door, reducing boarding and alighting speed.

Municipal Responsibility for Both Infrastructure and Bus Procurement: In the organizational structure of TransJakarta, the implementation body is the Jakarta Municipal Government while the operation body is Jakarta Express Transit (JP JET), which is a public authority formed from four existing bus companies and a public sector taxi company. JP JET operates buses purchased by the municipality during the period of their operating contract, which is only two years. Therefore, the entire cost and financial risk of the system has been assumed by the municipality.

Expected Demand Increase After Other Busway Opening: Although the first bus lane opened is only 12.9km long, additional bus lanes have been planned and the total network will be much longer. When the other bus lanes open, the demand for the first lane is expected to significantly increase. Therefore, it is essential to increase capacity in the initial corridor.


Source: ITDP

Newly procured bus Interior view of buses

LESSONS LEARNED:

High capacity buses with more than two doors are necessary for a BRT system. The main reasons why TransJakarta’s capacity is much less than that of other BRT systems in the world are its bus capacity limitation and the slow boarding and alighting movements caused by the limited number of doors. High capacity buses with separated doors for boarding and alighting are essential to increase the capacity of a corridor through a BRT project.

A feeder system is important to capture passenger demand. Transjakarta’s lack of a feeder system results in it being less competitive compared to other private buses going much farther and demand is just barely sufficient to cover operating costs.

Buses should be procured and owned by bus operators. TransJakarta is an example where the entire cost and financial risk of the system has been assumed by the Municipality, with the operating entity lacking responsibility. Problems of this system resulted from the short operating contract period; JP JET does not have a strong incentive to maintain the buses, so the buses are already suffering from routine maintenance problems.

Technical training for bus operators is essential to introduce BRT systems in a developing country that does not have experience with modern bus operation systems. JT JET has difficulties with scheduling, estimating the labor required, and otherwise estimating costs and managing the business since none of the five companies forming it operated as modern bus companies in the past. Training and technical support should have been provided to the operators before the opening of the BRT.

Bus lane introduction without regulatory measures in a corridor increases traffic congestion in mixed lanes. To reduce traffic congestion on both bus lanes and mixed lanes through BRT projects, regulatory measures such as prohibition of bus operation in mixed lanes parallel to the bus lane, as well as increasing capacity in the bus lane, are important.

References:
Dr. Walter Hook, Institutional and Regulatory Options for Bus Rapid Transit in Developing Countries – Lessons from International Experience–, the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy, 2005; International Energy Agency, Cost Effective Transport System – A Case Study of Jakarta, 2002; ITDP, TransJakarta Bus Rapid Transit System – Technical Review, 2003; ITDP, Making TransJakarta a World Class BRT System, 2005; ITDP, BRT Planning Guide, June 2007; Naoko Matsumoto, Analysis of policy process to introduce Bus Rapid Transit systems in Asian cities from the perspective of lesson-drawing: case of Jakarta, Seoul, and Beijing, 2006; TransJakarta homepage

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